Having achieved so much at such little cost, the Japanese were naturally reluctant to halt their advance and to hand the initiative to their economically stronger opponents. Yamamoto in particular was most anxious to eliminate the American hold upon Hawaii in order to prevent any comeback by the United States in the central Pacific, while the Navy General Staff favoured operations to out the link between America and Australia by occupying New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the various island groups beyond. It even entertained the idea of invading Australia itself, but this was firmly rejected by the army, which still had its attention rivetted upon China and Manchuria and therefore opposed the use of so many troops for these distant campaigns. Nevertheless, certain operations were to be undertaken by the navy along the lines they had indicated, both for strategic reasons and for morale. The Navy General Staff's plan was favoured, for it was already clear that the Americans were intending to build up Australia as a spring-board for counterattack and were strengthening the island chain across the South-West Pacific. Moreover, Japanese forces had already advanced to Rabaul in New Britain, and then to the New Guinea coast and the northern Solomons by March 1942. However, the influential Yamamoto repeated his case for a strike against the United States carrier fleet at Hawaii and his argument received a great boost when, on 18th April, the Americans launched a surprise bombing raid upon Tokyo itself.
Since the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the United States had been hastily reorganising its defence forces in the Pacific while the enemy was busy occupying South-East Asia. On 31st December 1941 Admiral King took control of the US Navy while Admiral Nimitz was appointed C-in-C Pacific. Both were vigorous men, eager for action, but they realised that at this stage in the conflict their prime duty was to conserve their limited forces and to strengthen the island link to Australia, which became essential after the fall of Java, In the early months of 1942, therefore, the American carriers were chiefly engaged in covering troop convoys to Australia and to Port Moresby, Fiji and New Caledonia, which were rapidly garrisoned and turned into island fortresses to check the expected Japanese push into the South-West Pacific. But the Americans were also acting aggressively wherever they could, and on 1st February their carrier aircraft attacked the Marshall Islands. Five weeks later, strikes from the Lexington and Yorktown against enemy forces on the north-west coast of New Guinea caused the Japanese commander to postpone his advance upon Port Moresby until Nagumo's carrier force returned from its raid on Ceylon. Already, it was becoming clear that the aircraft carrier was the key weapon, both of attack and defence, in the wide expanses of the Pacific.
But King and Nimitz, together with Air Force General Arnold, had more daring schemes up their sleeve. They were keen to raise morale by striking Japanese soil itself, and with this object in mind Tokyo was the obvious target; by this, so they reasoned, Pearl Harbor would be in some way avenged. Obviously, carriers would have to be employed in this raid, for Japan was too far away from any US airbase. On the other hand, it was impossible to use carrier aircraft since they would have to be launched from a point outside the 500-mile picket boat patrol which the enemy operated, and the US navy possessed no plane which could fly the necessary 1,100 mile round trip. In any case, Nimitz did not wish to risk endangering his few precious carriers by having them wait around until the strike aircraft returned. The solution to the first problem was to use the Army Air Force B-25 Mitchell bomber, which could take off from a carrier if the pilots were given adequate training; the solution to the second problem was to instruct the bombers to fly on to the nearest Allied land base as soon as they had bombed Tokyo, which meant that the carriers could return as soon as the planes had taken off. Since the nearest base was in fact in eastern China, nearly 1,500 miles from Tokyo, the B-25 was an admirable choice; with extra fuel tanks fitted, it could carry a 2.000-lb bomb for almost 2,400 miles and would therefore be capable of this lengthy twin-leg journey. The pilots, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doolittle, were ordered to practise short take-offs and long over-water flights as preparation for this venture. Only sixteen bombers could be used, though, because they were too large to go below deck and because of the space they required for taking off.
The carrier selected for this operation was the Hornet, which left San Francisco on 2nd April 1942 with its escort of cruisers and destroyers. Eleven days later, it rendezvoused with 'Task Force 16' (the carrier Enterprise and its escorts) which was to give aerial cover on the outward journey when the Hornet's own fighters would naturally be kept below deck. The trip across the Pacific towards Japan went smoothly until the early morning of 18th April, when the force was sighted and reported by a patrol vessel while still over 700 miles from Tokyo. Anxiously Doolittle conferred with the naval commander, Vice-Admiral Halsey, and they agreed that it would be better to launch the planes, despite the fact that, because of the extra distance involved, there was now much less certainty of them reaching China afterwards. The B-25s therefore took off between 0825 and 0924, despite the heavy seas.
In the event, this proved to be a wise decision. The Japanese High Command was informed of the presence of the carriers by patrol boats, and appropriate defensive measures were ordered; these included the alerting of fighter squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries, and the despatch of Nagumo's carrier force for a counterstrike against the raiders. Unfortunately for all these preparations, the Japanese expected that the American attack would not take place until the following day, when their homeland would be within range of the US navy carrier aircraft. Doolittle's force thus achieved complete surprise when it reached Japan, four hours after setting off, and successfully dropped bombs and incendiaries upon Tokyo, Kobe and Nagoya. Aided by a tail wind, it then flew on to China but many planes ran out of fuel and, due to a misunderstanding, Chuchow airfield was not ready. The crews either dropped by parachute, or crash-landed their aircraft; but 71 of the 80 men involved survived. As for the carriers, they escaped unhurt and arrived back at Pearl Harbor on 25th April to a warm reception. As Nimitz and King had planned, the boost to American morale from the Tokyo raid was considerable.
On the Japanese side, there was considerable consternation at this attack, and especially at the idea that the Emperor's residence had been exposed to the danger of enemy bombs. Consequently, it was decided to keep four army fighter groups at home for the defence of Tokyo and other cities whilst revising the patrol and reconnaissance services. At the same time, a large-scale punitive expedition was despatched by the Japanese army to Chekiang province, whose residents had received the American flyers. Most important of all, the Tokyo raid decided the priority of the Japanese strategic plans. The fear of further raids by American carrier forces upon Tokyo and perhaps upon the Imperial Palace caused the collapse of the Navy General Staff's opposition to Yamamoto's scheme for an advance into the central Pacific. This latter operation, which aimed at destroying the US Pacific Fleet and neutralising Hawaii as an enemy base, became much more important than efforts to cut the island chain between America and Australia. Therefore, on 5th May, Admiral Nagano, the Chief of Navy General Staff, issued Imperial General Headquarters Order No. 18 to Yamamoto, instructing him to 'carry out the occupation of Midway Island and key points in the Western Aleutians in cooperation with the army'.
At the same time, the drive into the South-West Pacific was not going to be entirely halted. Having carried out the conquest of South-East Asia in a time which had astonished even the greatest optimists in Tokyo, the Japanese navy believed that it was capable of running two campaigns at once, even though their respective axes would be divergent. In any case, on 28th April Imperial General Headquarters had already ordered an advance to Tulagi in the southern Solomons, and to Port Moresby in southern Papua; the former would provide an advanced seaplane base to cover the next leap south, while the latter would bring Queensland within range of Japanese bombers. In addition, Nauru and Ocean Islands were to be seized, since Japanese agriculture would benefit from their important phosphate deposits. Since these steps had already been postponed once due to the activities of the US carriers, the Naval General Staff was determined that it should not happen again and confidently believed that they could be implemented in time to employ their own carrier force for the stroke against Midway in early June. Moreover, as soon as the US Pacific Fleet had been destroyed and Hawaii neutralised, the Japanese would then resume their advance to cut the link between Australia and America by operations to capture the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa.
The thrust into the Coral Sea area was placed under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Inouye, C-in-C, Fourth Fleet, who would direct the operation from Rabaul. As soon as he had received his instructions of 28th April troops were made ready and various naval forces were ordered to assemble at Truk in the Carolines. Inouye and his staff, in consultation with Tokyo, then finalised their plan, which was very elaborate and complex. On 3rd May the Tulagi Invasion Group was to land at its objective, lying a little to the north of the large island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons. This landing force was escorted by destroyers and minesweepers, and was given more distant cover by the light carrier Shoho and four heavy cruisers under Rear-Admiral Goto, which would then assist the Port Moresby expedition also. Part of the Tulagi landing force would move on later to capture Nauru and Ocean Islands. On 4th May the Port Moresby invasion fleet, consisting of eleven transports with destroyer and minesweeper escorts, would set off from Rabaul for its destination, which would be reached six days later. It had a support group of two heavy cruisers and would also be covered by Goto's ships. A subsidiary move of this operation would be the establishment by a seaplane carrier of a base at Deboyne Island in the Lousiade Archipelago, which lay off the southern tip of Papua. Finally, looming in the background and ready to deal with an American attempt to frustrate these schemes, would be Vice-Admiral Hara's 5th Carrier Division, consisting of the fleet carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers, this whole force being under the tactical control of Vice-Admiral Takagi. These carriers could field 42 fighters and 83 bombers, and would be helped by over 150 aircraft from Rabaul.
On the Allied side, a vast amount of reorganisation had taken place in the Pacific area in the early part of 1942, following Churchill and Roosevelt's settlement of the difficult problem of command. While the European theatre remained a joint Anglo-American responsibility, the British were to exercise operational control over Sumatra, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, India and the Indian Ocean; at the same time, the United States was given operational control of the whole Pacific area, including Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies excluding Sumatra. China was to be a separate theatre, under American tutelage. Following this, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff split their area of responsibility into two spheres; the South-West Pacific Area, under General MacArthur, with headquarters in Australia and also covering the Indies, the Philippines, the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea; and the Pacific Ocean Area, including virtually the rest of the Pacific (apart from South America), which was placed under Nimitz at Hawaii. This vast stretch was further subdivided into North, Central and South Pacific Areas, the latter being under Vice-Admiral Ghormley. Since MacArthur was responsible to General Marshall and Nimitz to Admiral King, any differences between the two regional commanders would have to be settled by the Joint Chiefs themselves. Potentially, there were points of dispute over many matters, for instance the decision that Nimitz would always control the carriers and MacArthur the army bombers throughout the Pacific, but they were forced to subdue their differences by the simple fact that it was precisely along the border line of their two commands, in the Solomons, that the Japanese thrust took place. Sheer necessity forced the early development of cooperation between the ground forces of MacArthur and the naval forces of Nimitz, with distinct benefits for later operations.
Throughout this period, too, American troops and reinforcements had continued to pour into Australia and the intermediate island chain. Nevertheless, the region was so vast that the highly mobile Japanese forces could strike almost anywhere and thereby outnumber isolated garrisons. Fortunately for the Allies, the Americans had managed to break the Japanese naval codes shortly after Pearl Harbor. This breakthrough, together with their knowledge of the enemy's diplomatic codes, gave Washington an enormous advantage and allowed it to make adequate preparations to meet any planned Japanese attack. In this case, the Americans discovered the main threads of the Japanese plan soon after its inception and Nimitz immediately sent all available forces to the South-West Pacific. It was not clear whether the Hornet and Enterprise would get back from the Tokyo raid in time for the impending battle, but the carriers Yorktown and Lexington (42 fighters, 99 bombers) were ordered to proceed to the Coral Sea with their escorting force of 5 heavy cruisers and 11 destroyers. The only other ships available were 2 Australian and 1 American heavy cruiser under Rear-Admiral Grace RN. Rear-Admiral Fletcher, soon to emerge as one of the most successful carrier commanders of the war, was in charge of all these ships and acting under the simple order to prevent the Japanese from taking Port Moresby. Provided command difficulties were sorted out, some assistance could be expected from MacArthur's air forces in Australia and New Guinea, but it was clear that the chief battle would be fought between the opposing carrier groups, which were almost equal in strength.
The action began on 3rd May, when the Tulagi Invasion Force took that island unopposed since the small Australian garrison there had been withdrawn in advance. At this stage, Takagi's Striking Force was cruising down the eastern side of the Solomons, intending to swing into the Coral Sea and trap any opposing enemy forces in the rear. The American force was split in two, for the Lexington (Rear-Admiral Fitch) remained far to the south, still refuelling, while the adventurous Fletcher had decided to push ahead in the Yorktown and search for the Japanese ships, intending to reunite his task force on the following day. However, at 1900 hours he received word of the Tulagi landing and immediately set off for the island, despatching the tanker Neosho and a destroyer to rendezvous with Fitch and then rejoin him 300 miles south of Guadalcanal on the 5th; radio communications could not be used, of course, for fear of detection by the Japanese. Throughout the 4th, Yorktown's aircraft struck at the Tulagi Landing Force three times, sinking a destroyer and three minesweepers and damaging several smaller craft for the loss of three planes. For the quantity of bombs dropped, though, this was rather a disappointing tally.
On the 5th, the two American carriers rejoined each other and proceeded across the Coral Sea towards Port Moresby, together with Grace's heavy cruisers. By that time, Takagi's Striking Force was rounding the southern Solomons while the Port Moresby Invasion Force was steaming steadily southwards from Rabaul. No contact was made on that day or the next, although Fletcher had learned from Intelligence reports that the invasion convoy was on its way and he planned to attack it on the 7th. Neither carrier force was aware of the other's whereabouts, although both were soon to be led astray by false sightings. Early on the 7th Japanese reconnaisance planes spotted the tanker Neosho and destroyer Sims, which had been detached by Fletcher, and reported these as being an aircraft carrier and a cruiser. Accepting this as true, Hara ordered a full-scale attack and flew off seventy-eight planes, which smothered the two American ships with bombs and torpedoes. The destroyer sank shortly after noon with heavy loss of life, but the blazing tanker was to drift westwards until 11th May, when 123 of its crew were rescued and the vessel was finally scuttled by the destroyer Henley. The important fact was that this episode occupied the attention of the Japanese Striking Force at a time when Fletcher's planes were also otherwise engaged and his carriers left almost defenceless.
So determined was the American commander to stop the enemy invasion force that he ordered Grace's heavy cruisers to dash ahead towards Port Moresby in case his own vessels were crippled by the Japanese. In fact, the departure of these cruisers merely took away part of Fletcher's anti-aircraft screen without them being able to play any decisive role. On the other hand, they were repeatedly attacked that day by land-based Japanese planes without being hit, and may have diverted this unwelcome attention from the American carriers themselves. Moreover, these various moves so alarmed Inouye back in Rabaul that he ordered the Port Moresby Invasion Force to swing northwards until the battle was settled. By this time, just as Hara's aircraft were being mistakenly diverted against the Neosho and Sims, Fletcher too was misled by a report that two carriers and four heavy cruisers were steaming to the north of the Louisiades. Believing this to be the main enemy striking force, ninety-three planes were launched from the American carriers. In fact, it was soon learnt that this message had been wrongly transcribed and the pilot had only spotted two cruisers and two destroyers. Nevertheless, Fletcher allowed the strike to proceed in the hope that the invasion convoy at least would be in the vicinity. This daring was partially rewarded when, shortly after 1100, the American aircraft sighted the close covering force for the troopships. Swooping down, they concentrated their attack upon the light carrier Shoho, which received thirteen bomb and seven torpedo hits, and sank within half an hour. 'Scratch one flat-top' was the welcome news sent back to the American carriers.
Both the opposing carrier forces, misled by false sightings, had employed the greater part of their air strength in attacks upon subsidiary targets. Both were now husbanding their planes, and waiting until they had definite news of their enemy's whereabouts. On the evening of the 7th, the Japanese learnt of Fletcher's position, and Hara despatched twenty-seven of his best night-flying pilots on a surprise raid. However, they failed to find their target due to poor visibility and were fiercely attacked by the American fighters, which had been directed onto them by radar. Nine of these bombers were shot down, and another was lost when it attempted to land upon the Yorktown by mistake. Eventually, the rest of this group returned to the Japanese carriers but eleven were lost whilst trying to land in the dark; only six planes survived this mission.
During the night, both commanders considered ordering their cruisers to attack the enemy but then decided to wait until the morning, when fresh aircraft strikes could be mounted. Reconnaissance planes having spotted each other's group, attack forces were flown off from both sides around 0900 on the 8th. Ninety minutes later, the American aircraft (seventy-six in all) located the Japanese ships but the Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall almost immediately afterwards. All efforts were then concentrated upon the Shokaku, which was hit by three bombs. On the other hand, the torpedoes were ineffective, the vessel was not holed below the waterline and the crew managed to put out the fires. At 1300 it proceeded at a slow pace back to Truk. Two hours earlier, fifty-one Japanese bombers had located Fletcher's carriers and pushed aside the flimsy fighter defences to ram home their attack. The nimbler Yorktown dodged many assaults and, even when it was hit by a 800-lb bomb, still managed to land and despatch planes. However, the Lexington, with its larger turning circle, failed to escape from a mass attack by torpedo bombers, which scored two hits. Shortly afterwards, she was also hit twice by the dive-bombers but when this action finished at around 1120, she was still capable of steering and had managed to correct a heavy list. About one hour later, though, the ship was shaken by tremendous internal explosions after some fuel vapours had ignited, and the flames spread out of control. At 1630 she came to a halt and the crew was swiftly taken off before the destroyer Phelps sank the blazing vessel with five torpedoes.
The battle of the Coral Sea was now over and both sides withdrew from the area. Hara believed that his pilots had sunk both American carriers and, when ordered later by Yamamoto to search for the remnants of the enemy force, discovered that Fletcher was no longer in the vicinity. Despite this, the cautious Inouye had decided to postpone the Port Moresby invasion, since he feared heavy attacks from Allied land-based aircraft. The seizure of Nauru and Ocean Islands was also abandoned. The Americans could rightly claim to have won a strategical victory, therefore, and to have inflicted the first real check upon the Japanese thrust into the South-West Pacific. In terms of matériel, the matter was rather closer. The Americans had lost a fleet carrier, a destroyer and a tanker; seventy-four aircraft; and 543 killed and wounded. The Japanese had lost a light carrier, plus those vessels sunk during the Yorktown's strike upon Tulagi; over one hundred aircraft destroyed or badly damaged and 1,074 killed and wounded.
Blessed with hindsight, we can see that the American victory was even more clear-cut. This had been the first great carrier battle, during which no combatant ship had sighted a surface enemy throughout the five-days' engagement. In the wide Pacific, this was clearly going to be how battles would be decided in the future, particularly as both sides were limbering up for the Midway struggle. But whereas both the Japanese carriers were put out of action, the Shokaku because of bomb damage, the Zuikaku because it needed to replace its aircrews, Fletcher was able to get the Yorktown ready in time for the next round of the conflict.
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